Fang Binxing, widely known as the architect of China’s “Great Firewall,” is now behind a global network exporting invasive surveillance and censorship tools to authoritarian regimes.

Internal documents from his company, Geedge Networks, reveal that these technologies are actively used in countries such as Myanmar, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and Ethiopia.

Shockingly, some of these systems rely partly on European software, highlighting the complex web of international collaboration enabling digital repression.

How does repression go digital?

The leaked Geedge Networks data paints a disturbing picture: regimes are using software capable of monitoring individual internet usage, blocking VPNs, and even launching targeted attacks on websites. These tools are not small-scale experiments—they are designed to operate at national scale, silently bringing millions of people under government surveillance.

In Myanmar, for example, when the military junta seized power in February 2021, the internet essentially went dark. Social media platforms were blocked, VPNs neutralized, and citizens’ devices were inspected at checkpoints. Only pre-approved sites remained accessible, cutting off any avenue for dissent or reporting on human rights abuses. Kian Vesteinsson from Freedom House warns that Myanmar’s digital environment is now “on par with China” in terms of censorship.

Ethiopia presents another grim case. During the Tigray conflict, internet and phone blackouts lasted nearly two years, directly affecting humanitarian aid and communication, with severe consequences for civilians. Freedom House describes these internet shutdowns as tools of war, used to control the narrative and isolate populations.

The man behind the tech

Fang Binxing was born in China’s Heilongjiang province in 1960. After earning a PhD in computer science and working as a lecturer, he became deputy chief engineer for China’s national cybersecurity emergency response system. There, he perfected the techniques that now underpin China’s censorship state: filtering content, blocking foreign websites, and deploying systems like the “Great Cannon” to take down targeted platforms.

Today, 1.4 billion Chinese citizens cannot freely access Google, WhatsApp, Wikipedia, or many international news outlets. Fang has long defended this model as a “natural reaction to something newborn and unknown,” claiming that censorship is a global phenomenon. But internal documents show that his commercial interests play a significant role in exporting these tools worldwide.

Geedge Networks goes global

Founded in 2018, Geedge Networks offers a portfolio of tools that make mass censorship and surveillance accessible even to governments with limited technical expertise. Key products include:

• Tiangou Secure Gateway – blocks VPNs, injects malicious code, and can launch web attacks.
• Cyber Narrator – a monitoring interface that tracks internet activity in specific regions.
• TSG Galaxy and Network Zodiac – systems for storing and analyzing user data and network activity.

According to leaked records, countries including Myanmar, Pakistan, Ethiopia, and Kazakhstan hold licenses for the Tiangou Secure Gateway, with additional clients hinted at across the globe. Fang himself has publicly stated ambitions to expand internationally, recruiting employees willing to travel for months to implement systems in multiple countries.

European connections

The investigation reveals that some Geedge technologies rely on Western software. For example, French firm Thales provides components that control licensing, ensuring subscriptions cease when expired. While Thales insists its software is not involved in the surveillance functionality, the dependence highlights how European technology can inadvertently support authoritarian control. Additionally, installation packages for Geedge’s censorship tools have been hosted on a server in Germany, suggesting further links into European digital infrastructure.

Other Western companies, such as the Canadian Sandvine (now AppLogic Networks), previously provided technology used in Pakistan, which Geedge reportedly repurposed to build its own systems. This murky collaboration shows how authoritarian governments are increasingly able to assemble comprehensive surveillance networks from international components.

Why is this such a big deal?

The reach and sophistication of Geedge Networks’ tools are staggering. They don’t just block information—they enable governments to monitor, intimidate, and suppress dissent at scale. Activists and journalists in client countries face real danger from a system designed to operate invisibly. “People have no idea of this constant surveillance, and its incredible reach,” says Agnès Callamard, Secretary General of Amnesty International.

The leaked documents also suggest a growing appetite among authoritarian regimes for China’s model of digital control. With Fang Binxing actively expanding Geedge Networks abroad, and more governments expressing interest, the international footprint of these technologies is likely to grow rapidly. This is a chilling reminder that the tools shaping China’s tightly controlled internet are no longer confined within its borders—they are being exported to the rest of the world, sometimes with help from Europe.